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Paul Milgrom
My paper was initially inspired by Wilson’s program in the late 1970s, which
included setting rigorous foundations for notions like perfect competition and
rational expectations equilibrium using game theory. His 1977 paper “A Bidding
Model of Perfect Competition” pioneered this area. In it, he used a limiting
argument to show that the winning bid in an auction could be a consistent
estimator of the value of the good being sold, even when no single bidder’s
information could lead to a similarly accurate estimate.
Others were being inspired by Wilson’s program as well. In particular, I
remember meeting in the Stanford gsb courtyard with Bob and Roger Myerson
in the summer of 1978. After talking brieﬂy about my research, Bob speculated
that a standard auction might actually be a revenue-maximizing process. Roger
announced, “I know how to settle that!” and immediately undertook his famous
optimal auction analysis.
In my own paper, reprinted in this volume, I tried to use auction theory to
analyze the rational expectations equilibrium “paradox” — according to which a
price-taker whose information is “revealed” in the price has no reason to invest in
collecting information. My strategy was to introduce an auction model in which
information gathering was endogenous. To capture price-taking behavior, I used
a second-price auction, because the price a winning bidder pays then does not
depend on its bid and ﬁxes only the quantity — zero or one — that it receives
at the auction-determined price.
My ﬁrst challenge was the technical one of proving that an equilibrium exists
in this model with correlated values. I adopted Wilson’s assumption of conditionally independent types, adding the assumption that the family of conditional
distributions satisﬁed a monotone likelihood ratio (mlr) property. I showed that
the mlr property had three important consequences. One was that it implied a
certain single crossing condition in the bidder’s decision problem, leading bidders to select monotonic bidding strategies. Second, I showed that this single
crossing together with the ﬁrst-order conditions implied that the bid functions
were equilibrium bid functions. Finally, it enabled me to establish a “no regret”
condition that might now be called ex post equilibrium.
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What I couldn’t have known at the time was that the technical issues I began
to study in this paper would become be a recurrent research theme for me.
This next development for me began at a seminar dinner, when Eric Maskin
asked me what my model would look like in a Harsanyi-like formulation, in
which the only random variables in the models were ones that some player
observed. Like Wilson, I had used an unobserved ”common value” element
both to characterize the distribution of the conditionally independent types
and as part of the speciﬁcation of the individual bidder payoﬀs. Answering
Maskin’s question fed into my paper with Robert Weber (1982), in which we
developed our “general symmetric model,” which put all the bidders’ types
directly into a valuation function. We introduced the notion of aﬃliation of the
joint density function f (x1 , . . . , xN , v) to replace the twin assumptions about
conditional independence and the mlr property of f (xi |v).
Some time after that — I can’t recall exactly when, Wilson explained Tarski’s
ﬁxed point theorem to me. He showed his trademark excitement, suggesting that
because lattices played a role in aﬃliation as well as in Tarski’s theorem, there
might be a connection. Aﬃliation is indeed a lattice condition,

 equivalent to
the condition that the logarithm of the joint density, ln f (·) , is supermodular. Later, these lattice concepts would support analyses with John Roberts
(1990a,b) of manufacturing systems and strategic complementarity, with Bengt
Holmstrom (1994) of incentive systems, and with Chris Shannon (1994) of generalized comparative statics methods.
Quite mysteriously, auction and lattice ideas came together again when Wilson and I worked together on the fcc spectrum auction design. What we had
called “back-up strategies” in our original presentations to the fcc wound up
corresponding formally to the case of auctions when goods are substitutes. The
condition of “substitutes” is mathematically identical to the condition that the
bidder expenditure functions are supermodular. The monotonic auction process, with its monotonically rising prices, is simply a process to maximize the
supermodular net expenditure function, in that way ﬁnding a competitive equilibrium.
There was something quite profound in Bob’s advice and direction focusing
on market design issues and lattice techniques. Twenty ﬁve years later, after
spending so much of my career building on these few ideas, it is hard to imagine
what my scholarly life would have been like without Bob’s inﬂuence.
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